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Pollution is an inevitable side-product of economic activity. It can be reduced by spending a
fraction of total output on abatement activities.
It is examined first under what conditions sustainable growth is feasible and when this is optimal.
The influence of increased environmental care on the growth rate is traced. Increased
environmental care affects long-term output growth through three channels: crowding out of
investment, pruductivity improvements, and intertemporal substitution of consumption.
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1. Introduction
Recent models of macroeconomic growth endogenize the long-run growth rate and explain how
technological possibilities, preferences, market distortions and institutions affect economic growth
(e.g. Romer 1986, 1990, Lucas 1988, Grossman and Helpman 1991). Sustained growth is possible
because physical limits to growth are continually offset by the accumulation of capital and
knowledge, which requires a certain allocation of recources towards growth generating activities.
This literature on "endogenous growth" has arisen from the limited applicability of oldtr models
of (optirnal) growth where the long-run growth rate is exogenous (e.g. Cass 1965, Koopmans
1967). These models are unsuited to explain real world fenomena like persistent growth
differentials among countries and the recent productivity slowdown. Another shortcomming of the
Cass-Koopmans optimal growth framework is that it abstracts from externalities, public goods,
uncertainty and asyrrunetric information.
Among the externalities that are important in the process of growth are those associated with
pollution and environmental issues. Growth in economic activity may increase pollution and
environmental degradation, so that growth is less desirable when taking into account this amenity
value of the environment. Moreover, the quality of the environment affects the productivity of
production factors and consequently the rate of growth, e.g. by affecting the health of workers,
the quality of natural inputs, and the rate of capital depreciation. Since aggregate pollution matters
and individual agents ignore the effect of their own actions on aggregate pollution levels,
externalities arise. It is useful to separate the environmental amenity erternaliry from the
productivity e.uernality (cf. Pezzey 1989). E.g. Forster (1973) and Van der Ploeg and Withagen
(1991) co~uider the former externality by adding pollution as a disutility in the preference
ordering of economic agents. The productivity externality is incorporated in e.g. Nordhaus
(1982), where pollution enters the production function.
The relation between long-run growth and environmental issues has been the subject of public
discussion for long. The first report for the Club of Rome (Meadows 1972) received a lot of
attention. It used a complex dynamic simulation model to illustrate the limits to growth due to
exhaustibility of natural resources. The update version of the report (Meadows 1992) stresses the
dangers of rapid degradation of renewable resources. The rather pessimistic view in these reports
and from other envirorunentalists has been criticized by more optimistic economists stressing the
opportunities for substitution between natural and man-made inputs, technological change and
market incentives (see Nordhaus 1992). A more empirical contribution to the debate provides the
World Development Report (1992) that points at the relation between the level of economic
development and various kinds of environmental degradation. Other empirical studies focus
typically on environmental problems due to energy use and on the transitional growth effcts within
a neoclassical framework (e.g. Jorgenson and Wilcozen 1990).z
Surprisingly, the interaction between long-term growth and the environment is only rarely
tackled in analytical models. Incorporating environmen[al issues in neoclassical growth models
(e.g. Míiler 1975) is less suited to study this issue, since it assumes that the long-tetm growth rate
is exogenously given. The issue requires environmental aspects to be incorporated in the
endogenous growth framework. A formal model is important to precisize concepts and to check
the consistency of alledged feedback mechanistns. [t may clarify the debate between "pessimists"
and "optimists" by specifying what kind of conditions are needed for certain scenarios to azise.
This paper applies endogenous growth theory to deal with the question whether sustained
growth and environmental quality are compatible. A growth model is presented where pollution is
an inevitable side-product of economic activity. Pollution can be reduced by spending a fraction of
total output on abatement activities. Increased environmental care affects long-term output growth
through three channels: (1) the productivity effect: environmental care improves the quality of
natural and other factors of production which may enhance growth, (2) the crowding out effect:
the more resources are spent on abatement, the less aze left for growth generating activities, (3)
the intertemporal substitution effect: the crowding out effect may be offset by reducing
consumptive spending. Our model suggests that if the productivity of abatement is relatively high,
if the preference for the environment is relatively low and if the society is patient enough, an
increase in environmental care is associated with an inccease in growth. In the market economy
where abatement levels are too low due to environmental externalities, introducing the appropiate
tax (a pollution tax or the combination of a tax on economic activity and a subsidy on abatement)
will increase the growth rate under these conditions.
In Section 2, we examine under what condítions balanced and sustainable growth is feasible,
while Section 3 shows when this is optimal. Section 4 characterizes growth in [he social optimal.
To trace the effects of increased environmental care on the growth rate, two experiments are
considered. Section 5 deals with the effects of an increase in the preference for a clean
environment on the optimal growth rate. [n Section 5, the focus is on the internalizing of
externalities associated with pollution in the decentralized economy.
2. Production structttre and conditioos for balanced growth
Physical capital (IQ is the only (direct) factor of production. It should be interpreted as a broad
measure of capital, including for instance also hutnan capital and energy or natural resources
saving technical knowledge. The natural environment is an indirect factor of production. A higher
quality of the environment, which is directly related to the level of net pollution per unit of air,3
soil etc. (P),' positively affects the productivity of direct factors of production, e.g. by reducing
physical depreciation, enhancing the quality of natural inputs, or the health of workers. Output (1)
is allocated over consumption (C), pollution abatement (A) and investment (K). The shares of
output devoted to consumption and abatement are given by s~ and s, respectively. Net pollution
(P) is positively related to capital, to capture the polluting consequences of economic activityZ,
and negatively to abatement.
Y - Y(P, K)
!C - Y-C-A - (1-s~sJY
P - P(A, K)
YX~ 0, YPG 0,'
P~GO, P`~0.
Dividing (2) by K and substituting (1) and (3) gives the solution for the growth rate or the Hazrod
Domar condition:
8 - K - (I -s, -s~ - Y( P~ K 'K ) . (4)
It can be examined now under which conditions sustained growth is feasible given prodaction
technology, given the relation between pollution and economic activity and given spending on
consumption and environmental care (abatement). Especially we are interested in the familiar
concept of balanced growth. It is defined as the situation in which all variables grow at a constant
(possibly zero) rate of growth and in which the relative allocation of resources over spending
categories is constant (i.e. sa and s~ aze constant). The latter implies that A, C, K and Y grow at
the same rate. A constant rate of growth in the capital stock requires that K and Y grow at the
same rate. Hence, the output capital ratio must remain constant when K and A grow at a common
constant rate. This restricts the production function to constant returns with respect to capital,
taken into account the effects of capital acctunulation on pollution. Accumulation of capital
reduces the average product of capital through pollution (YPP,rdK) and this must be offset exactly
' Alternatively, the stock of accumulated pollution rather than the current flow of pollution
may detetmine the yuality of the environment. In Appendix B, we show that this assumption does
not affect qualitatively the conclusions for the steady state.
'[n the literature [e.g. Forster (1973) and Van der Plceg and Withagen (1991)] often output
( Y) is the source of pollution rather than capital. These assumptions are equivalent if capital (K) is
the only direct factor of production. A more complex pollution function could incorporate
consumption generating municipal wastes (as in Luptacik and Schubert 1982), and population
density occupying space and hindering the regeneration processes in nature.
' A subscripted function symbol denotes the partial derivative (F 8 BF~ax), a dot denotes
the time derivative (z-3x~dt).4
by the increase in spending on pollution abatement in line with capital accumulation (YPP,,dA) and
scale returns to capital ((YK-Y~K)dK). Formally, we need constant returns to scale (CRS) with
respect to the growing factors of production:
X~ - XY ~(Q-1) ~- Q - X(~-Y) - 1
where - aY~dP - aY~dK dP~aA - dP~r3K X-- Y,P , Q- Y~K . Y`- P,A . ~- P~K
Evidently, in order to sustain a balanced growth path, condition (5) must remain valid over time
once the economy grows along a balanced path. If the production function belongs to the class of
CES functions, the elasticities (3 and X depend on the capital pollution ratio (KIP) except in the
case that the elasticity of substitution equals unity. Since K~P changes along a balanced grow[h
path, a non-unitary elasticity of substi[ution cannot imply balanced growth as defined above since:
either (i) the CRS-condition will be valid some point in time but then inevitable be violated
because (3 and x change over time, or (ii) the CRS-condition is only reached asymptotically, i.e.
balanced growth occurs only at the infinite future. Hence we focus on a Cobb-Douglas production
function Y(K,P) where Q and X are parameters.' Following the same reasoning, ~-y has to be
constant along a balanced growth path. This is guaranteed if the pollution function features a
constant elasticity of substitution, so that both elasticities are either a function of the abatement
capital ratio AIK (but this ratio is constant), or are parameters.
Under these assumptions of constant returns to capital and constant elasticities, the output
capital ratio is a function of the abatement ratio only, YIK-y(sJ, and the growth rate is
endogenously determined by s, and s~ through [he Harrod-Domar or Goods Market Equilibrium
(GME) equation:
8 - (1 -s~ -s,) Y(SJ (GM~ (tí)
' If we would widen our scope to asymptotically balanced growth, non-unitary (but
constant) elasticities of substitution need not be ruled out. Consider the case that KIP rises over
time, i.e. the case where the natural production factor is scarce [this is the relevant case if ~~ y,
see ESG-condition (7)]. (i) If the elasticity of substitution between P and K exceeds 1, the
production elasticity of the fastest growing factor will rise over time. Hence, ~(K~P)-~(oo)-j-r
and X(K~P)-X(~)-0, if the production function is homogeneous of degree ~r. The CRS-
condition requires a constant return to scale production function (~r-1). However, this case is less
interesting for the subject of the paper, since it implies that the natural environment is not
essential for production. (ii) Alternatively, if the elasticiry of substitution falls shott of 1, the
production elasticity of the fastest growing factor will fall over time. Hence, -x(oo)-~r and
p(~)-0. Only the improvement of the environment accounts for growth. The CRS-condition
requires x(~)(y-~)-1. However, given condition (7), this implies yXZl so that the production
Y(K,P(A,K)) is not concave in A and that the second order conditions of the optimaliaation
problem are not satisfied.5
It can be derived that the elasticity of the output capital ratio equals y's~y-ryXl(1-y~10.'
All stylised growth models need [o impose restrictions on production functions to guarantee
balanced growth. If one introduces additional assumptions on the production stmcture as here by
introducing a relation between production and pollution, additional restrictions are needed. The
restriction of constant returns to growing factors in the aggregate production structure is well
known from e.g. Rebelo ( 1991)."
There are no a priori reasons why the conditions for balanced growth hold. In the model above,
growth will tend to zero if the growth in abatement spending is not enough to choke off the
polluting consequences of industrial activity (Xyt(3-ICXl`): pollution levels rise over time and
productivity levels fall. This can only temporarily be compensa[ed by raising the abatement
propensity sa, because abatement spending cannot exceed total income (sacl). Taking pollution
effects into account, there are diminishing returns to capital and therefore growth cannot be
sustained in the long run. The gloomy picture arises that by the nature of technology growth and
sustainable development are inevitably incompatible. In the opposite case, growth will rise
infinitely which can be slowed down by reducing so: abatement (and production) technology is so
succesful (i.e. there are increasing returns to capital: Xy-Xl`t(3~1) that a lower and lower shate
of output is to be spent on abatement to keep growth or pollution constant.
In the former situation, the issue of long-term growth attd environmental issues cannot be
addressed, while in the latter si[uation, the environment puts no limits on growth. Hence, it is
most interesting to confine the remainder of this paper on the situation of balanced growth.
Whether this situation is realistic is of course an empirical question. There is, however, neither a
priori reason nor empirical evidence to reject it. As argued by Weissmahr ( 1991), in the last
15,000 years, man managed to reorganize his way of living and producing such that the use of the
ecological system (measured as global energy use expressed in mega-watt-hours) rose at a factor
I0,000. In terms of our stylized model, this means that there are constant returns with respect to
the reproducible production factors K and A, so that long-term balanced growth is feasible.
Besides the influence of pollution on the economic subsystem (production), also the influence of
pollution on the ecological subsystem should be examined. Since the regeneration or absorption
capacity of nature is limited, there is an upper limit on the flow of net pollution that can be
maintained without irreversibly destroying eco-systems (cf. Barbier and Markartdya, 1990). This
upper limit, or critical load (to be denoted by I~, imposes an ecological viaóility constraint on
' Concavity of the production function requires that yXC 1.
" The forrnal structure of our model is comparable to Barro (1990), where the focus is on
infrastructure instead of abatement. We, however, assume that the environment (and therefore
indirectly abatement) enters both the production function and the utility function, consider
additional (environmental) constraints, study other forms of taxation and do not consider
abatement as a pure public good.6
balanced growth paths. Only equilibria for which PSP are ecologically sustainable. Balanced
growth can only continue forever if the growth path starts with a pollution level not exceeding the
critical load and if pollution does not rise along the balanced growth path so that the critical load
is not exceeded on future dates. Since in a situation of balanced growth pollution changes at rate
PIP-(~-y)g, the restriction
asy.
is necessary for ecologically sustainable growth (ESG).'
3. Preferences and optimal altocation
(ESG) (7)
The next issue is whether sustainable (balanced) growth is optimal. Social welfare depends not
only on per capita consumption of material goods but possibly also on the quality of the




Per capita consumption is denoted by c. By abstracting from population growth and normalizing
the population size to one, c-C. tn this section we consider the social optimum where welfare is
maximized by choosing the optimal level of abatement (A) and consumption (C) subject to the
production function (I), pollution function (3) and goods market equilibrium (2). The conditions
for an optimum are:
UyP~ t U~YPP~ - U~ - Bl. (9)
UPPX . Bl~YyPR t Yx) - á9~ - 9~. (10)
where B, is the costate variable. The first equation states that the marginal contributions of A and
C to welfare should be equalised every point in time. Using ~he definitions of the elasticities, this
can be rewritten as:
S, -Y(~~'X) rb ~-UPPIU,c. (l 1)
' Note that if strict inequality applies in (7), the balanced growth path tends to the
"ecological paradise" (cf. Michel 1993) in the infinite future where pollution approxitnates zero.T'he intuitíon behind this equation is that abatement activities are attractive (so~0) when pollution
is a disutility (~10) andlor when pollution affects productivity (x~0), provided that abatement is
effective in reducing pollution (y~0). If rp-0, so is independent of s~ and equal to yX. Optimal
abatement spending is then determined only by the productionlpollution structure and not affected
by preferences. If ~ 10, this dichotomy is no longer present. The abatement level can not be
choosen independently from the consumption level because there is a trade-off between
consumption and pollution levels through instantaneous utility U(c,P). Abatement is proportional
to consumption: the larger the relative importance of environment in utility (i.e. the larget m), the
larger is environmental spending relative to consumption spending (s,~s~).
The second condition (10) determines the dynamic optimality of the allocation. Using
U(c,P)-B, and condition (I1), one finds:
U c U P ( ) ~-.isa Y-~} n c y - ~r P 12
( Y) K U~ c U~ ) P.
This can be in[erpreted as a variation on the well-known Ramsey rule. The LHS is the marginal
rate of return in consumption terms. It takes into account that a fraction of the gross marginal
product of capital (i.e. pYIIQ must be spent on abatement costs ((aIy)s,YI1i7 to maintain the
productivity of capital. Note that if ~Iy is large, capital is relatively heavily polluting and
abatement relatively ineffective, which means that the marginal abatement cost associated to
capital is large. The LHS is called the social rate of return (~. The Ramsey rule equates the
social rate of return to the required rate of return, which is on the RHS. It depends on the growth
rate g for two reasons. First, as usual, the faster growth in consumption is, the faster trtarginal
utility falls and the less tomorrow's returns to savings are valued: a larger rate of growth implies
less consumption smoothing for which a premium over the pure rate of time preference is asked,
equal to the second term on the RHS. Secondly, growth is associated with changes in pollution (if
1` ~y) which ís a second source for changes in the marginal utility of consumption (provided that
U~P~O). It results in a premium in the required rate of return, equal to the last term on the RHS.
Conditions (I l) and (12) show that restrictions on the utility function are needed to guarantee
that growth is balanced in the optimum (cf. King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988). From (L1) it is clear
that s, and s~ will only be constant if ~ remains constant while C and P grow at a possibly
different rate. This means that the elasticity of substitution between consutnption and
environmental quality in the utility function must be unity.e Otherwise, growth in intAme would
make it optimal to substitute consumption spending for abatemetu spending or vice versa. Since
ecologically sustainable growth requires that pollution does not grow in the steady state, the
" By definition, ~ evolves over time according to ~~~-( 1-lla„ )(PIP-élc), where a„ is the
elasticity of substitution between c and P in utility.consumption to pollution ratio rises and the contribution of pollution to social welfare declines (~
declines). However, this invokes substitution effects because the disutility of pollution will rise (a
clean environment becomes more and more scarce relative to consumption). If environmental
yuality and consumption are poor substitutes, the latter effect will dominate, ~ rises and abatement
spending (s,) is enlarged.
From equation (12), it is clear that the elasticity of marginal utility, both with respect to
consumption and with respect to pollution (i.e. the terrns in brackets on the RHS), should be
constant if c and P grow at a possibly different rate. Otherwíse, constant growth rates of pollution
and consumption are associated with a growth rate of marginal utility of consumption that varies
over time and, consequently, a varying required rate of return. This would cause the social rate of
return to vary as well, so that sa and Y~K cannot be constant.
Appendix A derives the specification of the instantaneous utility function that guarantees
balanced grow[h, which reads:
~ c~P-~~~-o~ fo. :1
U(c,P) - ` 1 p`
I
lnc - rbinP ~
(13)
Note that in the case [ha[ the environment has no amenity value (m-0), equation (13) reduces to
the standard CRRA utility function, where p~ is the coefficient of risk aversion.
In a situation of balanced growth, (12) can be written as:
s - ~Q - (aJr)s,] y(sJ - o
P
(DD-curve) (14)
where pap~f(p~-1)(y-~)~ indicates how the (steady state) required rate of return is related to the
(steady state) growth rate g. Equivalently, llp can be interpreted as the (steady state)
intertemporal rate of substitution.
4. Abatement and growth in the social optimttm
Equations (6), (1I), and (14) provide the framework to study some elementary effects of increased
environmental care on optimal growth. From equation (6), GME, it is clear that a rise in the
fraction of income spen[ to abatement (s~ has ceteris paribus two opposite effects. On the one
hand, it reduces the fraction of income spent on investment (I-sas~) and therefore reduces growth.
On the other hand, pollution will be lower and the average productivity of capital ratio (y) is
enhanced which implies higher growth. The former effect can be labeled the crowding out effect9
and the latter the productiviry effect. The former, negative, effect can be (partly) offset by
lowering the propensity to consume (s~), which we will call the intertempora[ substitution eJject:
by reducing current consumption, capital is accumulated at a higher rate and future consumption is
higher.
Equation (6) represents the jeasib[e growth rate for given s, and s~. It is straightforwazd to
derive that for given s~ the growth rate dictated by goods market equilibrium and
productionlpollution technology is at its maximum if sa-ryX(1-s,): raising sa from this level will
depress growth because crowding out effects will dominate productivity effects, while lowering s,
will depress growth because a decline in productiviry dominates the crowding in of resources
available for investment. Equivalently, s,-yX maximizes (1-sJy(sJ-(Y-A)IK which is the net
average return to capital in the sense that abatement costs (A~K) are subtracted from gross return
YIK.
While (6) represents the feasible growth rate, ( 11) and (14) determine the desired levels of g, s,
and s~. First consider the desired level of abatement activities each moment in time. From
equation ( 11) we see that if pollution dces not matter in utility (~-0), s,-yX is the optimal level.
In an optimum, the net, or after-abatement-allowances, return to capital is maximized first and
then this maximum return is allocated over consumption and investment according to intertemporal
preferences. A lower level (s, ~yX) can never be an optimum, because a rise in abatement
spending is always welfare ímproving since it raises the average net return to capital. Thus,
startíng from seCryX, increasing abatement provides a higher productivity, from which higher
current consumption, higher growth in future consumption and~or lower levels of pollution can be
financed. If ~) 0, abatement is not only initiated to exploit productivity effects but also to reduce
the disutility of pollution, so s, will be higher than -Y7~.
Whether pollution enters utility or not, in both cases, optimal abatement spending sa will exceed
yx(1-s~) so that, given the optirnal consumption abatement ratio as expressed in (11), an increase
in abatement spending (sa) will reduce growth because crowding out effects dominate productivity
effects. The downward sloping curve SS in Figure 1 represents this negative relationship between
sa and g. Its mathematical form is found by eliminating s~ between (6) and (11):
8- ( X}~ - 1 f~Yga y(go)'
l ~ ~Y
(SS-curve) (15)
The SS curve portrays the feasible combinations of growth rate g and abatement spending s, if the
consumption to abatement ratio is set optimally. Which of these combinations is optima! depends
on intertemporal preferences, represented by equation (14).
Equation (l4) provides the dynamic part of the model depicted as curve DD. It portrays the
desired rate of growth for each sa which depends directly on the mazginal retum from savings. An
increase in sa has two effects. First it raises the tnargittal return to savings through the10
productivity effect on y, which provides an incentive to postpone consumption and raise growth.
Secondly, the larger sa, the more of the returns to savings (to capital) must be spent on abatement
activity: abatement allowances become a larger cost component which reduces the incentive to
grow. For large values of sa, [he latter effect dominates, the marginal return decreases with s„
and DD slopes downward so that the curve is hill-shaped. Simple manipulation reveals that the
two effects balance at s,-Q-yX y~. If the gross returns to capital are large (~ large), if
productivity effects are strong (yX large), or if abatement is relatively effective and capital
relatively clean (y~ large), then productivity effects dominate over a lazge range for s,. In this
range, increasing the abatement propensity fosters the marginal rate of return to savings and a
higher rate of growth is desired (DD slopes upward). The society is willing to reduce consumption
enough to prevent crowding out of growth generating activities.
"" insert Figure 1 "'
The intersection of DD and SS determines s, and g in the social optimum. It can be shown (see
Appendix C) that the model is saddlepoint stable if the SS curve cuts the DD curve from above.
Intuitively, this can be explained by invoking the correspondence principle. The SS curve gives
for each sa the feasible or acrua! growth rate, conditional on the optimal s,Is~ ratio (equation il).
The DD curve gives the desired growth rate based on intertemporal preferences. To the left of the
point of intersection in the stable case, the actual growth rate exceeds [he desired one. This is an
incentive to lower the actual gtowth rate by raising abatement spending (along with consumption
spending to maintain the optimal abatement consumption ratio).' The difference between the
actual and desired growth rate diminishes and an equilibrium is reached if the desired growth rate
rises or falls less than the actual growth rate in response to the increase in s,.
Since only one predetermined variable (i~ plays a role in the model, the economy immediately
jumps to the balanced growth path due to the saddlepoint stability: the allocation of production
over abatement, consumption, and investment is constant, capital grows at rate g and pollution
declines at rate (y-~)g. However, if such an economy starts with a low capital stock, it may fail to
satisfy the ecological viability constraint: eco-systetns (and hence the economy) only remain viable
if pollution does not exceed the critical level P. [f the capital stock is low, the level of abatement
for a given fraction of income spent on abatement (sJ is low and the level of pollution is high,
possibly higher than the maximum admissible upper limit.
The importance of the ecological viability constraint is illustrated by the phase diagram in figure
2. The curve labeled PP represents the minimum abatement capital ratio for which this constraint
(P5P) is satisfied. For constant elasticities y and ~, the curve is defined by P-A'K''-P or:
' This is a movement along the downward sloping SS curve.II
A - p-l~r K-lr aYr.
K
PPcurve
The line á-0 represents the saddle path to which the economy jumps if the constraint is not
binding. If the initial capital stock is low (say Ko), choosing this path would result in too high a
pollution level. For this "poor" economy, it is necessary to choose temporarily higher abatement
spending. The optimal trajectory is path BE and from E following the saddle path.'o For some
period, the fraction of production allocated to abatement is determined by the ecological viability
constraint (P-P). The remaining part of production is spent on consumption and investment so
that capital and production grow. To prevent pollution from rising over time, abatement spending
(A) has to rise, but as long as abatement is relatively effective, i.e. y~~, the abatemen[ capital
ratio is allowed to decline. When enough capital has been accumulated (K-f~C , it becomes optimal
to realize a decline in pollution: [he economy has outgrown of the ecological constraint and
proceeds along the saddle path. If y-~, the PP line is a vertical line. Capital accumulation does
not relieve the ecological viability constraint since a constant abatement capital ratio is needed to
keep pollution constant. Hence, outgrowing the constraint is not possible then.
"' insert Figure 2 "`
The phase diagram also illustrates the possibility of a low development trap. A very poor
economy cannot attain sustainable development. E.g. if the initial capital stock is ICo', all
production is needed for abatement so that capital cannot be accumulated. If investment is
reversible, the existing capital stock is gradually transformed into consumption and abatement and
falls to zero within finite time. If investment is irreversible, the slightest decline in the capital
stock causes the economy to collapse because then poflution cannot be maintained on the
ecologically viable level.
5. increased environmental care and optimal growth
Now we turn to the question how a shift in preferences towards more environmental concern
affects the optimal rate of growth. Hence, we examine the effects of a rise in ~. To highlight the
main mechanisms of the model, we restrict this experiment to the case where a and y are fixed
'o Each other path will result in eirher zero consumption and an infinite capital stock, or
growing consumption until the capital stock is zero and consequently consumption drops to zero.
The fotmer cannot be optimal of course (it violates the transversality condition), while the latter
violates first order condition (10) on the moment that C drops to zero (cf. Blanchazd and Fischer
1989, p.46 and 75).12
(i.e. the pollution function is specified as P-AYKA) and to the case that the environmental viability
constraint is not binding. We characterize the growth effects by analyzing the shifts in the DD and
SS curve. Since the shift in the DD curve depends on the values of y, 1` and p~, it is useful to
distinguish the following cases.
p~ -1
If p~- l, so that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is unity and the marginal utility of
consumption is not affected by the level of consumption (p-l, UP-O), a shift in environmental
preferences (~) changes the optimal growth rate by affecting the SS curve only. By the preference
shift, the marginal benefits of abatement rise so that the optimal abatement consumption ratio
increases (see equation 11). Equivalently, the consumption abatement ratio falls so that for a given
fraction of abatement spending s, more resources are allocated to investment. This means that the
curve SS shifts up. If [he DD curve slopes upward, the preference shift induces higher abatement
spending which raises the marginal return to saving and therefore the optimal rate of growth. If
DD slopes downward, increases in s, lower the marginal return to savings so that growth is less
desíred and the optimal growth rate falls.
The interesting question is now when the upward sloping part of the DD curve is relevant. A
positive slope requires that the top of DD is situated to the right of the initial level of s, which is
at least yX. Since, as noted before, the top is at s, - yX.R.yI~, two conditions must be fulfilled.
First, X must exceed zero. Second, the lazger is the initial value of s„ the more must Q-yI~
exceed 1, which implies by the CRS-condition (5) that the larger must be the gap y-~. If
abatement is relatively effective (y large) and capital relatively clean (a small), increasing
abatement spending s„ may increase the mazginal product of capital. Hence, it is not only
attractive to increase abatement relative to consumption spending, but also to reduce current
consumption and raise savings to realize higher growth. The latter is the intertemporal substitution
effect, invoked by the rise in the marginal product of capital. Intuitively, the two conditions state
that it is only attractive to postpone consumption and realize higher growth in response to
increased environmental preferences if there aze productivity effects associated with the
environment and if abatement technology is succesful enough while capital is relatively clean.
The preference parameters t9 and (the initial value of) rb determine the initial value of s,. The
the lower is r9 (this shifts DD up) and the lower is the initial value of rD, the lower is the initial
value of s, and the more likely is the upward sloping part of DD relevant. In contrast, a society
with high pure rate of time preference J or a low rate of intertemporal substitution l~p prefers
high levels of current consumption (s~) and low levels of curcent pollution (so high levels of
abatement s,) to high rates of growth. As we saw before, if abatement is already high relative to
the productivity maximizing level yX, increasing abatement increases significantly pollution costs,
while additional productivity effects are small so that on balance the rate of rétum and thel3
incentive to grow fall.
Y-~
If an x~ rise in capi[al requires an .r~ rise in abatement to keep pollution constant, i.e. ~-y, the
steady state rate of intertemporal substitution is independent of ~ and a rise in ~ causes only the
SS curve to shift upward, while leaving the DD curve unchanged. Fur[hermore, the DD-curve is
downward sloping. The marginal return to capital falls if abatement spending (sJ increases.
Hence, there is by the intertemporal substitution effect an incentive to opt for lower growth in
consumption rather than higher growth. With both curves downward sloping, the preference shifr
unambigously decreases the optimal growth rate, independent of the siu of the intertetnporal rate
of substitution.
P~~1 and y1~
In the more general case where p~ ~ 1 and y, a, a change in ~ affects the optimal growth rate by
shifring both the SS and the DD curve.
In the case where p~, l, the steady state intertemporal rate of substitution (llp) decreases when
the concern for the environment increases. This can be explained as follows. As can be checked
[see (A9) in the Appendix], the marginal utility of consumption increases with pollution (U~P~O).
Consumption becomes more (less) valuable if pollution is higher (lower) because consutnption can
compensate for the disutility of pollution. [n other words, consumption and environmental
amenities are substitutes. With increased concern for the environment (higher ~), changes in
pollution have a larger impact on utility. It implies that U~ falls faster for a given rate of decrease
in pollution. Along an ecologically sustainable balanced growth path, where pollution is declining,
cunsumers are less willing to postpone consumption, the more pollution affects utility (i.e. the
higher is ~).
In the case where p~ G l, the steady state intertemporal rate of subs[itution is positively affected
by changes in ~, since the marginal utility of consumption now decreases with pollution (UPGO).
Additional consumption is more enjoyed if pollution is lower. In other words, consutnption and
environmental amenities are substitutes. Consequently, it provides an incentive to grow faster,
since it is attractive to postpone consumption to future periods where pollution is Iower and
consumption is more enjoyed.
Figure 3 illustrates the effects of a rise in tb. SS shifts up. If p~ 1 I, the DD curve shifts
downward so that growth may fall even if the upward sloping part of the DD curve was relevant.
If p~G 1, the DD curve shifts up and optimal growth rate may rise, even if DD is downward
sloping in the point of intersec[ion. It is interesting to note that s, may fall in response to the
preference shift towards more envirorunental concern. In this paradoxal situation, a higher level of
pollution is accepted since it is compensated by a higher rate of pollution reduction over time and14
a higher growth rate of consumption. Figure 4 gives some numerical results for the relation
between ~, p, and the optimal growth rate. It can be concluded that the less willing to postpone
consumption the society is (i.e. the higher p~ is), the more likely a rise in environmental
preferences (~) will decrease the optimal rate of growth.
insert Figures 3 and 4"'
Summing up, if ecologically sustainable balanced growth paths are feasible, environmental
preferences affect the optimal rate of growth. When pollution is constant in the steady state
(y-~), an increased preference for the environment will depress the optimal rate of growth. In
the case that abatement is relatively effective so that pollution falls along a balanced growth path
(y ~~), the optimal growth rate may increase in response to a small shift towazds more concern
for the environment only if improvements in the quality of the environment boost the productivity
of physical capital (x 10), if the initial preference parameter for a clean environment (~) is rather
low, and if the social discount rate (r9) is small or if the intertemporal rate of substitution (llp~ is
high.
6. Market equilibritun and environmental policy
An increase in environmental care in a market economy should be distinguished from that in a
first-best economy. Pollution is an externality in many respects for private agents. Increased
interest in environmental issues leads to environmental policy that creates incentives to internalize
these externalities. Here, this kind of policy is studied for a perfectly competitive economy
consisting of many infinitely living representative consumers attd n(where n is large) individual,
symmetric firms.
The consumer problem is to maximize utility function (13) above by choosing constunption
subject to the usual intertemporal budget constraint. This yields tlc -[rt~(p~ 1)PIP-3JIp~, where
r is the market rate of interest. In a situation of balanced growth this boils down to:
r-ó'PS' (16)
Each representative firm i tnaximizes profits by determining the level of capital (K,.) it employs
and the level of abatement spending. As before, firms suffer from pollution: e.g. smoke in the air
and noise reduce the health and productivity of its workers. However, only part of this pollution is
caused by the firm's own actions, while pollution of other firtns, partly transmitted through the
air, also affects the firm's working conditions. Hence production depends besides on privatels
capital inputs (K,), also on the firm's own pollution (per m' air), P„ and the pollution (per m' air)
caused by other firms. Firms only internalize the effects of own pollution on production
(measured by elasticity X), which is smaller than the social effect of pollution on aggregate
production (as before measured by X, so X C X).
In the symmetric equilibrium, each firm has the same pollution per m' air, which equals the
economy-wide level of pollution per m' air (P), and the same capital input, abatement and
production level, which are aggregated to K-nK,, A-nA; and Y-nY,. The production elasticity of
capital and the pollution elasticities of capital and abatement are given by Q, J~, and y respectively,
restricted by equation (5), so that on the aggregate level the production structure is as in the
previous sections and aggregate balanced growth is feasible.
The tnaximization problem of the firm reads:
-f~fa)á.
mtu. f~(1 -rY)Y~ -(1 -r~A~ - rPP; - I;~ t" dt,
0
s.t. Y, - Y(K. P;: P). R-YK~1Y. X-YnPIYcX. YPP~i;-X-X.
P; - P(A;, K~.
K~ - f;
(17)
Abatement is subsidized at rate ro, pollution is taxed at rate rP, while rY is a value added tax. The
first order conditions are:
~(1 -rr)(P-.iX) - ,iry(P;IY~~y - r, (18)
SQ -(1 - rr) Y1 t T rP(P~Y;) (AA-line) (19)
a
The first condition equates the private marginal return to capital, taken into account the tax
obligations and the fitm's own pollution effects associated to capital, to the market rate of interest.
The second condition equates the private marginal cost of abatement, consisting of after-subsidy
expenditures on abatement goods, to the private marginal benefit of abatement, which consist of
the (after-tax) productivity gain through the reduction in the fitm's own pollution and the
reduction in the pollution tax obligation.
Balanced growth (with constant r and so) requires constant tax rates rY and ro, while rP must
increase at rate ( l fry-~)g so that rPP;~Y, ~ ro is constant. Since production grows, firms can
finance the pollution tax obligation due to a given pollution level out of growing revenues.
Consequently, a constant pollution tax rP would imply a taz burden declining over time, and the
incentive for abatement would diminish over time. Hence, the pollution tax rP must rise over time
to prevent growing pollution.16
The market equilibrium is given by (6), (16), (18) and (19), solving for g, se, s~ and r. Figure 5
depicts the solution for g and s, as the intersection of line AA and the curve MM. The latter is
derived by eliminating r from (16) and (18):
I(1 - r)(i -.iX) - i d~ Y(sJ - D
g - r P . (MM curve) (20)
P
The line AA represents the profit maximizing sa, which is independent of g. The curve MM
represents for each sa the desired rate of growth in the market economy. The desired rate of
growth increases in sa. An increase in abatement raises the productivity of capital in temu of
physical output so that the marginal rate of return increases. This implies that the market rate of
retum rises and that consumers increase consequently savings.
"' insert Figure 5 "'
In the absence of intervention, abatement is too low in the market economy [compare (11) to
(19)] for two reasons: the effects of private abatement on other fimts' productivity and the effect
of pollution on consumers' utility are ignored by producers. Hence introducing a subsidy on
abatement (ra ~0) or a tax on pollution (iP~0) will improve welfaze. Moreover, by compazing
MM [equation (20)] to DD [equation (14)], it can be seen that, in absence of the value added tax,
for each sa~ yX the desired rate of growth in the mazket economy is lazger that in the social
optimum (MM is situated above DD). The reason is that the rnarket rate of return to savings (r) is
too high since it fails to reFlect the negative effects of an additional unit of capital on other firrps'
productivity and on utility. Only own pollution effects on own productivity (X) aze reflected.
Formally, from ( 18), (11), and ( 14) follows for given sa: r- r' - [y(X-X) f~~s~ ] y, where r` is
the social rate of interest defined above. A tax on economic activity or pollution (rY~O or rP~O)
can redress this externality.
Now consider the question how envíronmental policy, i.e. the introduction of the optirnal tax
and subsidy, will affect the rate of growth. There are two counteracting effects. On the one hand,
the policy has to remove the externality arising from the fact that fimts only take into account
direct productivity effects while aggregate productivity effects aze lazger (i.e. XcX). The
productivity gains from abatement are larger than perceived by individual fimts. Intetnalization of
this productivity externality stimulates growth": abatement activities aze then ezploited to
"To prove this, we need to compare the market rate of growth (where sa-yX) and the optimal
growth rate for ~-0 (where sa-yx). With constant elasticity of y(sr, it can be derived from (5),
~
(ll), (14), (20) and (21) that: pgA } d -(R-~Xl ~xlf-rx ~ 1 sirrce X~X n yXcl.
pg' d l~- XJ XJ17
maximize after-abatement-allowances returns to capital. On the other hand, the subsidy has to
raise abatement further because pollution is a disutility (~p10), which is not taken into account by
firms in deciding on abatement spending. The internalizing of this environmenta! ameniry
externality is very similar to a rise in m in the social optimum (from ~-0 to ~10). As illustrated
in Figure 5, the internalizing of this externality will depress the growth rate unless ~ and e9 aze
small and y~~(since then [he (social) marginal return to capital raises, i.e. the upward sloping
part of DD is relevant). On balance, the implementation of the optimal envirotunental policy to
internalize both externalities may raise growth if the external effects of pollution on productivity
are large (X-X large) relative to the disutility ofpollution (~ small).
How should the tax instruments be implemented to attain the first-best outcome in the
decentralized economy? Introducing the pollution taz only is sufficient. The ezpression for the
optimal pollution tax is found by equating the private and social abatement ratio [in (19) and
(11)], and equating the private and social rate of return [in ( 18) and (14)], with r,-ry-0:
rrsr
- (X'X~ f ~5~~~. (21)
where a double asterisk (~') denotes the optimal level of a variable. The optitnal tax is determined
by two components which retlect the productivity externality (X-X) and the amenity externality
(rtis~"). Since [he government budget, expressed as a fraction of national production, equals
rPP;~Y,áTp, equation (2l) reveals that this policy yields a budget surplus: pollution is a source of
revenue. However, in practice a tax on pollution may be difficult to implement due to
measurement problems and due to the fact that the optimal tax rate shou(d grow steadily.
Therefore, it is worthwile to consider a policy relying on the other two instruments.
The value added tax alone is not sufficient. The reason is that achieving the optimal optimal
abatement level requires subsidizing production which is to be considered as the indirect return of
abatement (T,.c 0), while, as noted before, achieving the optimal private return to capital requires
taxation (r,,10). Neither is the abatement subsidy alone sufficient, since this instrument can not
influence directly the marginal return to capital. Hence, both instruments are necessary. The
optimal rates and the corresponding excess of tax revenues over the abatement subsidy
expenditures (expressed as a fraction of aggregate output) are given by:
rr ~ - ~ (X -X) t ~sc ~ - [ '1 ~-,~X~~
- r (x -z) } ás~ ~ l
r"' ~ .~ P xzl R s, ~




where condition (5) is used to derive (24).
Fírst note that ro-1 if X-O: if in the absence of intervention firms do not internalize any effect
of pollution, abatement spending would be zero and should be financed entirely by the
government. Second, the government budget shows a deficit, unless ~-y, i.e. unless the polluting
effects of r~ growth in capital can be offset by x~ growth in abatement spending. The
environmental amenity externality (rb~0) requires a reduction in pollution (relative to the situation
where ~-0) through two channels: reducing the capital intensity of production and stimulating
abatement. If ~-ry, both channels are equally productive and it is efficient to stimulate abatement
exactly to the same amount as to which the use of capital is reduced. In contrast, in the case
where abatement is relatively effective and capital is only weakly polluting (y 17~), it is efficient
to tax capital only moderately (by rY) and to subsidize abatement heavily so that a budget deficit
arises. In that case, a lumpsum tax is necessary to sustain the first best outcome.
6. Conclusion
The model presented in this paper highlights some essential aspects of the interaction between
economic growth and pollution. First, we derived the conditions for feasibility and optimality of
economic growth in a one sector endogenous growth model where pollution is a side-product of
the utilization of capital and where pollution can be reduced by spettding part of the aggregate
output on abatement. Second, we traced the growth effects of environmental policy, which was
interpreted either as a shift in preferences towazds more concem for a clean environmen[ or as the
introduction of taxes to internalize the externalities associated with the environment. The results
may be refrased in terms of the debate on the desirability and the pace of growth in view of
environmental problems.
Those who are pessimistic argue that if pollution is an inevitable side-product of economic
activity and if the absorption capacity of the eco(ogical system is limited, growth in economic
activity cannot be ecologically sustainable. However, as is shown here, a growing economy can
produce a growing amount of abatement devices, so [hat, provided that abatement activities are
effective enough relative to the pollu[ing content of production activities, pollution stays constant
or may even fall if the economy grows (in terms of the model: ryzi`).
A second reason to be pessimistic is that there may be diminishing retutns with respect to
reproducible production factors due to ecological limits, so that growth cannot be sustained. There
is, however, neither a priori reason nor empirical evidence to believe so. There may be constant
returns with respect to the reproducible production factors (K and A), so that long-term balanced
growth is feasible. In tha[ case, the growth rate is ettdogenous: investment decisions and
environmental policies affect the long term-rate of growth. Nonzero growth may be optimal.19
But even if long-term growth is sustainable and optimal, there might be an inverse relationship
between environmental care and long-term optimal growth, because increased abatement activities
may crowd out growth generating activities. We showed that this negative effect on growth should
be confronted with two positive effects. First, there may be productivity effects: a higher quality
of the environment improves the productivity of production factors. Second, the marginal
productivity of investment goods may rise. Then, i[ is optimal to reduce current levels of
consumption to give way to both higher abatement and higher investment levels, as a process of
intertemporal substítution. Hence, the optimal growth rate may rise when preferences shift
towards more environmental concern, if there are productivity effects, if the marginal cost of
abatement activities is low, and if consumers are patient enough to postpone consumption.
A final reason to be pessimistic is the existence of externalities associated to pollution problems.
The market equilibrium may be characterized by a growth rate that is too high, because the
amenity value of the environment is ignored by producers. A pollution tax or subsidy of
abatement activities and taxes on polluting economic activities have to be introduced to redress the
externalities. However, also here pessimism may be premature. It is possible that growth in the
market equilibrium is too low, because aggregate productivity effects of a clean environment are
ignored by individual producers. Introducing the right taxes then leads to higher growth. Because
of the productivity externality, environmental policy that improves the quality of the environment
affects positively the productivity of production factors so that growth may rise. The government
budget need not impose strong restrictions on the envirotunental tax policy because taxation of
pollution yields revenues and an abatement subsidy can at least partly be financed by a value
added tax revenue.
Of course, we need an empirical assessment of scale economies, abatement possibilities,
productivity effects, etc. to know whether pessimism or optimism is justified. Moreover, there are
various ways to extend the present model that may be useful in the debate on growth and the
envirorunent. Firs[, labour can be introduced explicitly as a production factor (cf. Gradus and
Smulders 1993). Second, technological progress in pollution saving technology may be important
(cf. Bovenberg and Smulders 1993). Finally, public finance issues tnay be elaborated, such as
different forms of taxation, second-best situations, and publicly provided abatement (cf. Ligthart
and Van der Ploeg 1993).20
Appendix A
Specifications of the instantaneous utility function that guazantee balanced growth
Here we derive which specification(s) of [he instantaneous utility function U(c,P) satisfy the
conditions for balanced optimal growth. As explained in the main text, preferences should feature
the following characteristics:
(i). Ex hypothesi, consumption c is a utility and pollution P is a disutility:
U~~O and UPCO. (apriorirequrrements) (A1)
(ii). The maximization problem should be concave in the instruments c and A:
U~~C 0 and UPPP,,P,, f UPP,,,, G 0 (concavity requiremerus) (A2)
(iii). Along a balanced growth path where c and P grow at possibly different rates, the direct
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (p~), the relative weight of the environment in
utility (~) and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect to pollution
should be constanr.
-U~c~U~(-p~ and -UPPIU~c(~~) and UpPIU aze independent of the level of c
and P. (Balanced growth requirements) (A3)
First, we find the specification for U(c,P) with constant elasticity of margittal utili[y of





lnU~ --p~lnc t 1nN(P) - U~ - c-'`N(P) (AS)
where the constant of integration is defined as 1nN(.), which of course may depend on any other
variable than c, and hence may depend on the second argument of the utility ftmction, P.
[ntegration of (Atí) yields:
C ~ -P~
l p N(P) t M(P) for p~ sl
U(c,P) - ~ (A6)
lnc.N(P) t M(P) for p~-1
where M(P) is the constant of integration. Now calculate from these specifications:
-U,P~U~c ~ ~ -
-1 N~P M~P for p~Kl
1-p~ N Nct-v.
i i
- NP !nc - ~P for p~-1
(A7)
If p~~ 1, ~ is independent of the levels of c and P ortly if M'-0 and N'P~N is constant. Then?1
~--(N'PIN)I(I-p,), or equivalently, the elasticity of N(P) is equal to the constant N'PIN-~(I-p).
Therefore N(P) takes the form !y(p) - ly.p -~~~-o~~ and M(P) -M, where N and M are constants.
[f p~-l, ~ is independent of the levels of c and P only if N'-0 and M'P is constant. Then ~--
M'PIN, where N is a constant, or equivalently, M'(P)--~NIP. Integrating this last expression
shows that M(P) takes the form M(P) --~N 1nP f M.
Substituting these results into (A6) yields:
0 ~-v.
N(cp ~ f M for p~~l
1-p~
N(lnc -~1nP) t M for p~-1
(A8)
As can be checked
U~rPIU~ - 0(Pt~) !or each p~. (A9)
Hence, the specification in (A8) satisfies condition (iii). To satisfy condition (i), we must have
rb10 and N~O. Without loss of generality, N can be set to unity since it is a shift factor in the
ordinal utility function, while the additive term M can be set to zero. This yields equation (13).
Finally, condition (ii) has to be satisfied. For U GO we must require p~10. Concavity in A
imposes restrictions on the pollution function:
PMA~P~ UrpP
- PAA~P ~ UP - -~(1 -p~) -1. (A10)
Note that if the pollu[ion function is specified as P(A,K)-A'K'', then the LHS of (A10) equals -
(!ty)ly so that 1!y must exceed ~(1-p~). Hence, p~~l, which is the empirical relevant value, is
sufficient for concavity.zz
Appendix B: Pollution as a stock
With respect to several environmental problems, the effects of accutnulated pollution on ecological
systems, production, and welfare are more pronounced than flow effects of pollution. E.g. the
acidification of the soil, which damages both ecological systetns and environmental amenities like
landscapes, or the break-down of the ozone layer are processes that will not stop once their direct
causes, i.e. pollution like carbon-emissions, are curbed, but only afrer the stock of accumulated
pollution is assimilated or broken down. Modelling pollution as a stock (cf. Tahvonen and
Kuuluvainen 1990, Bovenberg and Smulders 1993) is therefore more realistic, but it complicates
our framework without affecting qualitatively our (steady state) conclusions. This is shown here
by amending the model and reducing it to a diagram in the g, sa plane which is basically the same
as in the main text.
The accumulation of pollution is represented by:
~ - P(A, K) - N(S) (B1)
The flow of pollution P adds to the stock of pollution S, and a certain part N(S) of this stock is
broken down each period due to the assimilative capacity of the environment. In the simplest
specification, a fixed proportion (ó) of the stock can be assimilated so that N(S)-èS. If, on the
other hand, further accumulation of wastes deteriorates the absotption capacity of na[ure, we must
assume: N'S~NG 1.
The s[ock of pollution S rather than [he flow P now matters, so we replace P by S in the
production function ((), the utility function [(H) and ( 13)], and the definitions of x and ~. The
condition for ecological sus[ainability is amended into SGS. This precludes that S grows at a
constant positive rate, which requires in view of (B1) that the flow of pollution in the steady state
does not exceed the absorption capacity of nature: PSN(S). Consequently, the flow of pollution is
not allowed to rise over time so that restriction (7) is again a condition for ecologically sustainable
balanced growth.
For balanced growth to be feasible, further restrictions are to be imposed. Consider first the
simplest specification of the waste accumulation function (B1). If N(S)-óS, the stock of pollution
can grow or fall at a constant proportionate rate by maintaining a constant P~S ratio. Since the
flow of pollution declines at rate (ti-~)g, the stock of pollution will decline at the same rate.
Endogenous growth requires constant returns with respect to the reproducible factors, so again
restriction (5) is neccesary. However, if nature's assimilative capacity is featured by N'SING1, a
constant rate of decline of the tlow P results in a non-constant (viz. increasing) rate of decline in S
so that balanced growth is only feasible if P is constant in the steady state, i.e. if S-y. Below, we
work out the case N(S)-êS, which also incorporates the special case of constant steady state level
of pollution by taking 1`-ry.
The fact that S and P will change at the same rate in the long-run makes already intuitively
clear that the growth effects in the model with pollution as a stock (the "stock-model") must23
resemble those in the model with pollution as a flow (the "flow-model"). Also the level effects are
similar in both models, since the long-run level of S is directly and positively related to that of P.
The main difference is that pollution as a stock introduces additional intertemporal aspects.
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where B, denotes the costate variable for pollution accumulation. Combining (B2), (B3) and (B4)
yields, after applying the definitions of the elasticities, the DD curve which is for the long-run
exactly the same as in the main text [eq. (14)]. We assume again that the production function and
the pollution function are of the Cobb-Douglas type (so ~, X, 1`, and y are constants) and that
N,-ó. In the steady state, S~S is constant, so PIS is constant, and SIS-P~P--(y-1,)g. The steady
state PIS ratio follows from (B1):
PIS - b - (Y-a)8.
Combining this result with the production function, taking into account (5), gives the steady state
output capital ratio:
Y p-i - rr 4Tt-nl
K
- ayK S x - (aYS, [d-(Y-~i)8~-x) - Y(5,,8)-
Differentiating (63) and eliminating B,It3, using (B2) and (13) yields:
B~Bi - (~ }Y-a-P)8.
Substituting this result into (BS) and rewriting gives:
S' - 1




This equation relates optimum abatement spending and consumption spending. It is identical to
equation (Il) of the flow-model, apart from the factor UtG. Note that if ó-~~, i.e. if Ihe stock
effects of pollution are negligible because assimilation is very fast, ,~-~l so that (11) and (B7) aze
identical. Furthermore, note that 5t(p-l)g-r'-g10 and that ó-(Y-1`)g~0 [see (B6)], so that24
~~ 1: abatement spending relative to consumption spending is less than in the flow-model because
the benefits from abatement arise only after the stock of pollution is adjusted which takes time.
The higher time preference and the lower [he assimilation capacity of nature (which equals the
adjustment speed of S), the lower will be abatement spending ceteris panbus relative to the flow-
model (8~~dt9 ~ 0, d~18ó G0).
Eliminating s~ between the goods market equilibrium equation (6) and (B7) yields the SS-curve,
which is implicitly defined by:
O- 8 l 11 }~l l1 }
~8)l sa 1 Y(5,,8) - F(5,.8)~ (SS-curve) (Bg)
To examine the properties of the SS-curve, lcalculate:
l( l ( YX l(mY YX ll
ása - á~rJll rxl S" l~ Jt ~r}d~ ~11'
aF - 1~ II z (r-~)g t SaY aty.
á8 11-rx a-(r-~)8 ~r a8
aF v~ S rx . a~ -- ~Y ,- ~
In normal cases, the first two derivatives are positive. Then the slope of the SS-curve is negative
as in the flow-model, since by the implicit function rule dglds, ~~--(BFIBs~I(BFIBg). A sufficient
(but far from necessary) condition for BFIas,~ 0 is tG(~ry f yX)I(~yt tG) U since s,~ ryXhy as
appears from (B7). This condition is satisfied for ~ytyXG 1. A sufficient (but faz from
necessary) condition for aF13g10 is d~lagl0, which is satisfied for p~11 - (y-~)t9l[lf(y-~)~].
This is a mild condition in view of the empirical relevant value ofp~ z 1. ~
The SS curve shifts upwards for an increase in ~ since 8gld~~~--(aF~am)!(aFlBg)~0 for the
relevant values of s~ [see (B7): sa~ryxhG].
Summing up, the DD-curve remains unchanged, while the SS-curve slopes downward and shifts
in the same direction as in the flow-model. Hence, the qualitative properties of the model remain
the same (for the long-run) whether pollution matters as a flow or as a stock.zs
Appendix C: stability of the model
Here we proof that the optimal growth model of section 3 is saddle point stable at least for a
sufficiently large value of the preference parameter p~, by reducing the model to a differential
equation in the single variable a-AIK and showing that this equation has a positive root.
First, we rewrite the model in the variables K, a~AIK, and x3CIK. Equations (11), (12) and
(2) can be rewritten as:
x- UI~Y) ( a- YX y). (C1)
!~y -(uY)a - Bfb~r t P~(zIx) f mY(P~ 1)(bIa) f p(1fUK), (t~)
KIK - y - a- x- bx, (C3)
where we introduced capital depreciation at rate bK (in the main text bK-O). From [he Cobb-




x- f(a) a, where f(a) - a ar(YX)
x a af-rr - ay(YX)
(C4)
(CS)
Using (C1), (C3), (C4) and (CS) to eliminate y, x, KIK, and sIx in (C3) respectively, yields the
following differential equation in a as the reduced form of the model:
á - a {B1aYx . Bza . Bj},
P~Í(a) ~ tbY(P~ -1)
where Bi - - [1 t(Y-~)~] ~P~(1'X~~)-1) ar
Bz ` [1 '(Y-Z)~1 (P~(1 .I~mY) -1 ~
Bj ? - [ tf . (1-p) óx]
(C6)
The model is saddlepoint stable if the RHS of (C6) is increasing in a, at least for values of a
around the steady state solution (say a-a'", defined by á-0). Consider now the relevant range
for a. In an interior solution, a is restricted by x?0 (consumption is nonnegative) and afx 5 y
(the sum of consumption and abatement does not ezhaust production). Taking into account (C1)
and (C4), this yields the bounds for a:
Q?(aYYX~U(1-rF) s a s á- ( a YX'~Y lLT!-r:)
l Y 1 ' ~Y 1
(C7)
We use (C7) in determining whether the factor in accolades in (Ctï) is increasing in a. A
necessary condition for the latter is :
BlYX ' -Bz a~-r,r. (Cg)26
Given the signs of B, and B„ we can distinguish three cases:
(i) p~ ~~yl(yXt~y), so that B,cO and 8.~0. In this case (C7) is satisfied if:
Bt YX lrer
-rrl f YXt~Y-~YrP~ ~~ -rxl
a~ I B~
J
- I arYX~ ~
.~Y-~Y~P~ IJ
(C9)
Since the RHS lis smaller than the lower bound a, the inequality is satisfied ittdeed.
(ii) ~yl(1 f~y) ~ p~ ~~yl(yX f~y), so that B, ~0 and B1 ~0. In this case (C7) is satisfied
if (-B,IB~yx ~a~ ". Since the LHS is negative, the inequality is satisfied.
(iii) p~ C~yl(I f~y), so that B,10 and BiCO. In this case (C7) is satisfied if inequaliry (C9)
with the inequality sign reversed is satisfied, implying that a should be below its lower
bound, which is of course never the case in an interior solution.
Hence for p~ 7~yl( l t~y), the factor in accolades in (C6) is increasing in a. The differential
eyuation (C6) then has a positive root if the premultiplying factor is positive. This is indeed the
case for p~~ rtiyl( I f~y). Note that f'(a) c 0. Hence f(á) yields the minimum relevant value for
f(a). Substituting the minimum value both for p~ and for f(a) yields for [he denominator of the
premultiplying factor-.
1~Y ll (YX'~Y) -(~ tmY)(YX)1-
1~,
which is positive since yXC 1, so that the entire factor is positive.
Now we can conclude that, at least fot p~~~yl(lfrby), à is increasing in a so that the model is
saddlepoint stable. This implies that a-A~K, and all other variables, immediately jump to their
steady state values.
It can be shown that the stability condition stated in the main text is equivalent with the
argument stated here. The downward sloping SS-curve should be steeper than the DD-curve, or
equivalendy, the difference between the two slopes should be negative. Calculating this difference
and substi[uting the definitions of B, and B1, this conditions can be written as:
- arÍ ~rP 1 fB2at-rs . BlYX~ ~ p,
a l 1-YXJ l
which is equivalent to (C8) if p~0.z7
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Figtu~es
Figure 1 Optimal growth and increased environmental care for logarithmic utilily (p~-1)





a. y-)` b. ry ~~, ~ and J large, c. y~),. ~ and r9 small
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The figure assumes ry1~, a Cobb-Douglas type production function Y-a,IC~Fx and pollution
function P-A'K"; and reversible investment. The line K-0 follows equations (C4), (2) and (11),
while the line C-0 follows from (1l) and (C4). The definitions of a and á aze given in (C7),
á .~ aY~ir~-~ri
Figure 3 Increase in ~ in the s„gdiagram (y 1 a)







Figure 4 dgld~ and ds~d~ for alternative values oj p~


















Figure 5 Market equilibrium and Internaliung the environmenta! externalities
lnternalizing the pnxluctivity extemality raixs sa from yX to yx, and g from g'" to g'.
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